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Abstract
The Market Failures Approach (MFA) is one of the leading theories in contemporary business ethics. It generates a list of 
ethical obligations for the managers of private firms that states that they should not create or exploit market failures because 
doing so reduces the efficiency of the economy. Recently the MFA has been criticised by Abraham Singer on the basis that 
it unjustifiably does not assign private managers obligations based on egalitarian values. Singer proposes an extension to 
the MFA, the Justice Failures Approach (JFA), in which managers have duties to alleviate political, social, and distributive 
inequalities in addition to having obligations to not exploit market failures. In this paper I describe the MFA and JFA and 
situate them relative to each other. I then highlight a threefold distinction between different types of obligations that can be 
given to private managers in order to argue that a hybrid theory of business ethics, which I call the MFA + , can be generated 
by arguing that managers have obligations based on efficiency and duties based on equality to the extent that these latter 
obligations do not lead to efficiency losses. This argument suggests a novel theoretical option in business ethics, elucidates 
the issues that are at stake between the MFA and the JFA, and clarifies the costs and benefits of each theory.
Keywords Market failures · Justice failures · Efficiency and equality
Introduction
One of the leading theories in business ethics is Joseph 
Heath’s market failures approach (MFA) (Moriarty 2017, 
Sect. 4; Singer 2018, p. 97, 104; Moriarty 2020, p. 113). 
The MFA generates a list of ethical obligations for manag-
ers in businesses that tell them to not exploit market failures 
because doing so reduces the efficiency of the economy 
(Heath 2014, p. 34) and this efficiency (which results from 
competition driving prices towards market-clearing lev-
els) is the value that, in combination with a welfare state, 
justifies the pursuit of profit in the first place (Heath 2014, 
pp. 29–31). The MFA is a plausible and attractive theory 
on a number of grounds, as I shall argue below. However, 
it has been criticised by Abraham Singer for not taking 
enough account of the value of justice (understood here as 
an egalitarian value) when generating ethical obligations 
for managers (Singer 2018, pp. 104–106). Singer argues 
that, in addition to having ethical obligations to address 
and not exploit market failures, managers have obligations 
to address justice failures: that is, failures of the state to 
properly “achieve some morally desirable form of equality” 
(Singer 2018, p. 107). Singer proposed theory of business 
ethics is an extension of the MFA called the justice failures 
approach (JFA).
In this paper I will clarify what’s at stake between the 
MFA and JFA, how exactly they differ, and where they are in 
tension with one another. This will help assess the costs and 
benefits of each approach and set the grounds for choosing 
between them. I will argue that the JFA is not as attractive 
an option in business ethics as it may first appear to be. 
Many of the justice-based obligations generated by the JFA 
can be either independently justified on efficiency grounds 
(and thus justified from within the MFA), or else be incor-
porated into the MFA due to the fact that pursuing such 
justice-based obligations will not create deadweight losses 
which represent reductions in economic efficiency. However, 
there are other justice-based obligations which would create 
distortions in the price mechanism, and to this extent would 
compromise efficiency: I argue that this should be seen as 
 * Charlie Blunden 
 c.t.blunden@uu.nl
1 Department of Philosophy & Religious Studies, 




a cost, rather than a virtue, of accepting the JFA. However, 
whether this cost is seen as problematic for the theory ulti-
mately depends on how much efficiency one is willing to 
give up in order to achieve a certain level of equality.
I will firstly outline the MFA, paying particular attention 
to the precise kind of “efficiency” that grounds the obliga-
tions that the MFA provides and explicating the division of 
moral labour between the market and the state within the 
theory. Secondly, I will cover a recent criticism of the MFA. 
Heath’s view has been challenged in the literature because he 
seems to slide between two conceptions of efficiency when 
developing the MFA: Pareto efficiency and Kaldor-Hicks 
efficiency (Moriarty 2020). I will clarify exactly what kind 
of efficiency is at work in the MFA. Thirdly, I will outline 
the JFA in comparison to the MFA. I will describe how the 
JFA extends the framework of the MFA by questioning the 
division of moral labour between the market and the state, 
and I describe the ethical obligations that it generates for 
market actors. Fourth, I will discuss compliance issues for 
both the MFA and the JFA, and highlight how these com-
pliance issues might bear on the division of moral labour 
promoted by the MFA. Fifth, I will highlight an important 
distinction between different types of obligations that are 
relevant when comparing the MFA and JFA: between obli-
gations that have a dual justification, such that they can be 
justified either by appeals to efficiency or to justice, obliga-
tions that are foreign to the market, and obligations that are 
antithetical to the market. With this threefold distinction in 
hand, I will assess the three domains of justice-based obliga-
tions promoted by the JFA in the sixth, seventh, and eighth 
sections: the obligations concerning political, social, and 
distributive justice outlined by Singer (2018, pp. 108–113). 
In each case, I will assess which specific obligations could 
be generated from within the MFA or else incorporated into 
it, and which obligations cannot be incorporated due to their 
efficiency-frustrating effects. In the ninth section, I will out-
line the key issues at stake in deciding between the MFA 
and the JFA, and briefly comment on how the question of 
efficiency-equality trade-offs might be resolved. I will con-
clude by revisiting some extant options for theories of busi-
ness ethics: the first being the MFA, the second being what 
I call the MFA + , which consists of the ethical obligations 
of the original MFA plus those justice-based obligations that 
can be incorporated into the MFA, and the third being the 
JFA, now with a more explicit understanding of the losses 
in efficiency that will likely be caused by some of the ethical 
obligations that it recommends.
The Market Failures Approach
The MFA as outlined by Heath1 is best understood within the 
context of an overall theory of justice. This overall theory is 
contractualist and aims at fairly distributing the benefits and 
burdens of cooperation in a society. Systems of co-operation 
generate mutual benefit, which participants have a common 
interest in maximising: however, they also generate a conflict 
of interest, because each party prefers a larger to a smaller 
share of the cooperatively achieved gains. Sometimes the 
conflict involved in cooperation can be resolved by drawing 
upon shared cultural resources (Heath 2014, 151), but even 
where this is not possible two normative principles suggest 
themselves based on the structure of the interaction itself: 
a principle of efficiency, such that their common interest 
should maximised, and a principle of distribution, which 
stipulates some concept of equality which should be used to 
resolve conflicts of interest (Heath 2014, p. 182).
The concept of efficiency that the background contrac-
tualist theory uses is Pareto efficiency: “the principle that, 
whenever it is possible to improve at least one person’s con-
dition without worsening anyone else’s, it is better to do so 
than not” (Heath 2014, pp. 9–10; Varian 2010, pp. 15–16).
Competitive markets are good at promoting Pareto-effi-
cient exchanges because when market actors compete for 
profit they push prices towards market-clearing levels: the 
price mechanism creates what are known as scarcity prices 
which allow supply and demand to reach equilibrium, where 
the price that consumers pay for a good represents the social 
cost of that good: namely the opportunity cost of using 
resources to make that good rather than other goods that 
could have been made with the same resources (Heath 2014, 
chap. 1, 2009). These price levels allow the minimisation of 
waste in the economy, by maximising the resources that are 
spent producing goods that people want, as opposed to goods 
that they don’t want (Heath 2014, p. 29).
The formal proof of this idea comes from the first fun-
damental theorem of welfare economics, the conclusion of 
which is that a perfectly competitive market would maxim-
ise (and exhaust) all possible Pareto-improving exchanges 
(Arrow and Debreu 1954; Heath 2014, pp. 196–197; Singer 
2018, p. 99). The conditions of perfect competition include 
that there are no market failures (no externalities, no trans-
action costs, no information asymmetries between custom-
ers and suppliers), no economies of scale, and no ability 
of individual suppliers to influence prices (with all firms 
1 A theory very similar to, if not the same as, Heath’s MFA has been 
proposed by McMahon (McMahon 1981). On whether these theories 
are identical or merely very similar, see Moriarty (2020, 115–116). I 
focus here on Heath’s version of the theory primarily for reasons of 
simplicity.
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being “price-takers and not price-makers” (Scitovsky 1952, 
p. 21; cited in Blaug 2007, p. 187)). These conditions do 
not exist in the real world (Heath 2009, Chap. 3). To make 
matters worse, we also cannot directly use the first funda-
mental theorem to draw conclusions about our world of 
non-perfect competition. This is due to another economic 
theorem called the general theory of second best (Lipsey and 
Lancaster 1956). The general theory of second best shows 
that once even one of the conditions of perfect competi-
tion is not fulfilled, there is no guarantee that the market 
which best approximates the remaining conditions of perfect 
competition will in fact produce the most Pareto-efficient 
exchanges. Once one market distortion, for instance a trade 
barrier, is in place we have moved away from the situation 
of perfect competition: the second best efficient economy 
may now in fact be one with additional trade barriers (addi-
tional moves away from the conditions of perfect competi-
tion) (Heath 2009, pp. 78–79). While the theory of second 
best prevents us from directly using the first fundamental 
theorem of welfare economics to guide policy decisions, 
it is nonetheless true that in many cases allowing market 
actors to compete with one another will drive prices towards 
market-clearing levels and thus enable the number of Pareto-
efficient exchanges in the economy to be maximised (Heath 
2009, pp. 79–80, 2014, pp. 40–41, 2019, pp. 25–26).
Crucially, as prices are driven towards market-clearing 
levels there is a reduction of deadweight losses in an econ-
omy. A deadweight loss is an unrealised Pareto-efficient 
exchange. This is a situation in which there is someone will-
ing to sell a good and someone willing to buy it at the price 
that is lower than the current market price, however, these 
two parties are prevented from transacting. This is com-
monly due to the market power of a monopolist, who keeps 
the price above the level at which the transaction would take 
place, but the transaction can also be prevented by some 
other contingency of the world that prevents parties from 
contracting (Varian 2010, pp. 304–306, 448–49; McEach-
ern 2012, pp. 215–216; Heath 2014, pp. 188–89, 2019, 
pp. 23–24). Competition between businesses drives prices 
towards market-clearing levels, which in turn increases the 
number of mutually-beneficial (Pareto-efficient) exchanges 
that occur (Heath 2014, p. 100, 197).
However, while promoting Pareto efficiency is one of its 
key principles, the overall theory of social justice is also 
concerned with equality, and therefore with some “concep-
tion of distributive justice” (Heath 2014, p. 10). Put roughly, 
the implicit justification of market institutions is that they 
promote Pareto efficiency by driving prices to market-clear-
ing levels. To the extent that it promotes such market institu-
tions capitalism can receive justification, but:
[I]t is only when embedded within the broader context 
of a welfare state, which engages in both market-comple-
menting and redistributive policies (primarily through the 
tax system), that capitalism as a whole can claim to be just 
(Heath 2014, p. 10).
While an overall system of social cooperation can only 
claim to be just if it balances the value of efficiency with 
the value of equality, this does not mean that all institutions 
within a society must be equally concerned with promoting 
both values. As is evident in the previous quote, the MFA 
holds that there should be an institutional “division of moral 
labor” in which the purpose of the market is solely to max-
imise the number of Pareto-efficient exchanges that occur 
(by competing to drive prices to market-clearing levels), 
while the state is tasked with resolving market failures to 
promote efficiency and promoting morally-desirable forms 
of equality (Heath 2014, p. 203).2 If we want the efficiency 
promoting effects of the price mechanism, then we must 
keep demands for distributive justice away from the opera-
tion of the market and avoid the temptation to pursue dis-
tributive goals by fixing prices or by hampering the ability 
of market actors to compete with each other by means which 
do not exploit market failures. Instead we should promote 
equality by redistributing income and wealth via taxation, 
ideally trying to limit the impact of said taxes on prices 
(Heath 2009, Chaps. 7, 12). Asking the market to achieve 
distributive justice is likely to result in prices that do not 
reflect the market-clearing level: thus some “portion of the 
utility realizable through exchange will, in effect, be thrown 
away” as a deadweight loss, and we begin to lose the “mas-
sive efficiency gains” that market-clearing prices deliver 
(Heath 2013a, p. 167).
Justifying the Division of Moral Labour
Singer has argued that the division of moral labour in the 
MFA is justified by the second fundamental theorem of 
welfare economics (Singer 2018, p. 105): which states that 
given a particular allocation of initial assets, a competitive 
economy could generate any one of a set of Pareto-optimal 
outcomes, including outcomes that would be picked out by 
“one’s favored concept of equality” (Heath 2014, p. 183; 
Blaug 2007, p. 185). The second fundamental theorem 
means that having a market that solely promotes efficiency is 
compatible, at least under certain conditions, with egalitar-
ian outcomes. While Heath does not explicitly argue that the 
division of moral labour within the MFA is justified by the 
second fundamental theorem, Singer holds that the division 
of moral labour is implicitly “underwritten” by the theorem 
(Singer 2018, p. 105). Singer then notes that the conditions 
2 Specifically, the state is tasked with creating legislation to curb 
market failure when such legislation can be enforced without generat-
ing administrative costs that are greater than the efficiency gains from 
the intervention (Heath 2014, p. 34, see also 2011, pp. 23–28).
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under which the second fundamental theorem holds, as with 
the conditions under which the first fundamental theorem 
holds, are not fulfilled in the real world: this then forms 
a jumping-off point for his argument in favour of the JFA 
(Singer 2018, pp. 105–107).While the second fundamental 
theorem shows that there is no “conceptual incoherence” in 
wanting both efficiency and equality (Heath 2009, p. 280), 
in reality the institutional means to security equality (spe-
cifically distributive equality) typically have a distortionary 
effect on prices and thus lead to a reduction in efficiency 
(Heath 2009, pp. 281–286, 2014, pp. 183–186; Stiglitz 1994, 
p. 145).3 Thus, in reality, we are often faced with a trade-off 
between efficiency and equality.
However, as the previous citations indicate, Heath explic-
itly acknowledges the point that due to “pragmatic and 
empirical difficulties” (Heath 2009, p. 281) the “real world 
never even comes close to satisfying the conditions under 
which [the second fundamental theorem] would be true” 
(Heath 2009, p. 280). It could of course be the case that 
Heath is simply being inconsistent on this point, and that 
he is implicitly relying on the applicability of the second 
fundamental theorem to justify the division of moral labour. 
However, I believe there is a more plausible justification 
for the division of moral labour contained in Heath’s work, 
which I will now explicate. It begins with the observation 
that, empirically speaking, there are more and less inefficient 
ways of achieving egalitarian gains. For example, trying to 
achieve morally desirable forms of equality by directly fixing 
prices will distort the ability of said prices to communicate 
relative scarcity, and so will lead people to make decisions 
which will reduce the overall efficiency of the economy 
(Heath 2009, pp. 154–158). More broadly, ascribing man-
agers obligations based on everyday notions of fairness, 
equality, and distributive justice is often in conflict with the 
competitive structure of market interactions: a competitive 
structure which is justified by its efficiency promoting effects 
(Heath 2014, pp. 29–31, 110, 199–200). A much less ineffi-
cient way of promoting equality is through forms of taxation 
which aim to be as non-distortionary to prices as possible 
and to alter people’s incentives as little possible. For exam-
ple, countries which spend a large percentage of their GDP 
on their welfare states (with both efficiency and equality pro-
moting functions) typically rely on consumption taxes (such 
as value added taxes) for funding rather than income taxes, 
as the latter discourage investment and therefore reduce the 
capital available for competition (Lindert 2004, pp. 241–43, 
295). Value-added taxes are also harder for individuals or 
businesses to avoid than income taxes, which lowers the cost 
of collecting the tax: a consideration further discussed in the 
“Distributive justice failures” section (Slemrod and Bakija 
2008, pp. 197–99). More promisingly still, there are cases 
where the state can introduce taxes aimed to curb market 
failure: for instance, a carbon tax. In such cases, the tax can 
be justified on efficiency grounds because it is aimed at cor-
recting a price (e.g., the price of carbon) which is incorrect 
due to a market failure (Nordhaus 2013, Chap. 19). Such a 
tax is likely to promote efficiency, and the revenues can then 
be used to pursue egalitarian gains (Heath 2009, Chap. 12).
Drawing on these examples given by Heath, in my view 
the division of labour between the state and market in the 
MFA is best seen as being justified by an empirical gen-
eralisation: namely, that when market actors are asked to 
carry out obligations to promote equality this will often 
conflict with the competitive orientation that is required in 
the market, thus reducing the ability of the market to push 
prices to market-clearing levels, and thus resulting in signifi-
cant efficiency losses. Conversely, when the state is asked 
to carry out obligations to promote equality, the resources 
available to it to carry out these obligations (e.g., taxing to 
prevent market failures, using value added taxes, etc.) will 
result either in straightforward efficiency gains or in less 
serious efficiency losses than if the obligations were pur-
sued by market actors. This argument that the division of 
moral labour is justified by an empirical generalisation will 
be further explored in the sixth, seventh, eighth, and ninth 
sections of this paper.
The Obligations Given by the MFA
Given that efficiency is the value that justifies the pursuit 
of profit (provided the market is embedded in the broader 
context of a welfare state), what kinds of ethical obligations 
apply to managers in the market economy? The MFA replies 
that managers have an ethical obligation not to engage in 
behaviours that create or exploit market failures (Heath 
2014, pp. 36–37). Market failures are Pareto-inferior out-
comes in the market due to less-than-perfect competition, 
caused by things such as information asymmetries between 
buyers and sellers or externalities such as pollution (Heath 
2014, p. 34). Due to their negative effects on efficiency, 
engaging in behaviour that creates or exploits market fail-
ures goes against the value that justifies the pursuit of private 
profits within the market in the first place: as such, manag-
ers should refrain from all these forms of behaviour. Heath 
provides the following as examples of the kind of obligations 
set out by the MFA:
 1. Minimize negative externalities.
 2. Compete only through price and quality.
 3. Reduce information asymmetries between firm and 
customers.
 4. Do not exploit diffusion of ownership.
3 For a description of this trade-off specifically in the domain of 
redistributive taxation see Slemrod (2006, pp. 74–76).
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 5. Avoid erecting barriers to entry.
 6. Do not use cross-subsidization to eliminate competi-
tors.
 7. Do not oppose regulation aimed at correcting market 
imperfections.
 8. Do not seek tariffs or other protectionist measures.
 9. Treat price levels as exogenously determined.
 10. Do not engage in opportunistic behavior toward cus-
tomers or other firms (Heath 2014, p. 37).
As can be seen, the MFA generates quite a robust set of 
ethical norms for managers solely on the basis of efficiency. 
In addition, because efficiency is a value that is internal to 
the market (it is the value on the basis of which the market 
is justified), the MFA can claim that its ethical norms are 
derived from the structure of the market, rather than being 
imposed on the market from the outside. In this way, the 
MFA is a kind of ‘immanent critique’ in business ethics: 
it accepts that the point of having markets is to maximise 
the number of Pareto-efficient exchanges, but then uses this 
normative principle to generate a robust set of norms for 
managers which form a critique of contemporary business 
practice (Singer 2018, p. 104).
Moriarty’s Criticisms of the MFA
The MFA has recently been criticised by Moriarty (2020) on 
two separate grounds. Exploring these criticisms is useful 
for getting clearer on the normative criteria that the MFA 
uses to generate the above list of obligations, and for under-
standing the relation of the MFA to the general theory of 
second best.
Moriarty’s first criticism is that the MFA claims to ground 
its obligations in the value of Pareto efficiency, but that it 
actually relies instead on Kaldor-Hicks (KH) efficiency. A 
transaction is KH efficient if it creates a winner and a loser, 
but the gains to the winner are sufficiently large such that 
they could fully compensate the loser while still having 
benefitted relative to the status quo before the transaction. 
Thus KH efficient transactions can be thought of as those 
which improve aggregate welfare, or which are potentially 
Pareto-efficient. Why does Moriarty claim that the MFA 
uses KH efficiency rather than Pareto efficiency? Because, 
so he claims, the MFA cannot justify the above obligations 
using the standard of Pareto efficiency.
For instance, the fifth obligation on the list, to avoid 
creating barriers to entry, it clearly designed to prevent 
monopolies forming. But what, from the point of view 
of Pareto efficiency, is so bad about the transactions that 
a monopolist carries out? The monopolist and the cus-
tomer purchasing from the monopolist both benefit from 
the transaction, and so it is Pareto-efficient. Furthermore, 
getting rid of the monopoly by introducing competitors 
would increase the number of exchanges happening, but 
at the cost of severely cutting into the profit margin of 
the former monopolist. As the monopolist is made worse 
off, this transition cannot be Pareto-efficient: if we are to 
justify the MFA’s obligation to prevent monopolies and 
encourage competition it must be on the grounds that, 
while monopolists are hurt by such a policy, the policy 
nonetheless increases aggregate welfare by enabling many 
more exchanges to happen, and so is KH efficient (Mori-
arty 2020, pp. 117–120; Heath 2019, pp. 22–23).
The response to this line of objection is that, while any 
change away from a market failure (e.g. a situation where 
there is a monopoly) will not be straightforwardly Pareto-
improving (Heath 2013b, p. 51), in general resolving market 
failures will enable the price mechanism to function cor-
rectly, generating a set of scarcity prices which will max-
imise the number of Pareto-improving exchanges in the 
economy. We can thus see that the standard of Pareto effi-
ciency is what underlies the obligations in the MFA (we 
are not trying to create scarcity prices in order to maximise 
the number of KH efficient exchanges), while allowing the 
undeniable point that an exchange between a monopolist and 
their customer is Pareto-efficient and that monopolists lose 
out when competitors enter the market.
Moriarty’s second line of criticism can be thought of as 
targeting the “in general” proviso in the previous paragraph. 
Given the general theory of second best, how can we claim 
that managers should follow the MFA’s obligations designed 
to alleviate market failures on the grounds that this promotes 
Pareto efficiency, when we know that sometimes an imper-
fect market can be made more efficient (can be made to 
create more Pareto-efficient exchanges) by the addition of 
more market failures? It seems like the second best theory 
deprives the MFA of its source of justification, rendering it 
problematically ideal (Moriarty 2020, pp. 120–123). It is 
true that, due to the theory of second best, one cannot claim 
that removing market failures will guarantee increases in 
Pareto efficiency: the link between removing market failures 
and promoting Pareto efficiency is instead an empirical gen-
eralisation. However, we can doubt whether, in the messy 
domain of applied ethics, we can obtain any normative obli-
gations where following these obligations is morally desir-
able by necessity under all circumstances: this seems like too 
stringent a standard to set. Furthermore, in most cases where 
we are directing obligations to managers of firms in reason-
ably competitive markets, it remains true that exploiting or 
creating market failures (generating negative externalities, 
colluding to fix prices above market-clearing levels, etc.) 
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will decrease the number of Pareto-efficient exchanges that 
occur (Heath 2019, p. 25).4
The Justice Failures Approach
The JFA agrees with the MFA that managers should not 
exploit market failures (Singer 2018, p. 97). However, 
the JFA disputes that the MFA’s division of moral labour 
between the market and the state can be upheld in non-ideal 
conditions. Singer argues that the division of moral labour 
can only be upheld in conditions where the demands of jus-
tice to promote equality are being appropriately met by the 
state, because it is only in these conditions that the mar-
ket’s sole pursuit of efficiency is justified (Singer 2018, pp. 
105–106, 2019, 238–40). However, the state routinely fails 
to achieve morally desirable forms of equality. In an analogy 
to the concept of market failures, Singer calls these failures 
of the state “justice failures” (Singer 2018, p. 107).5 Singer 
characterises a justice failure as a failure “of the welfare 
state to achieve all possible movements towards equality 
consistent with efficiency” (Singer 2018, p. 107), and adds 
that this does not include failures to “level down” towards 
equality which is why he includes the qualification “equality 
consistent with efficiency” (Singer 2018, p. 107, Footnote 5). 
However, these two characterisations differ. Levelling down 
occurs when a greater level of equality is achieved merely 
by making the better-off worse off, rather than by increasing 
the welfare of the worst-off (Arneson 2013; Sect. 6; Weber 
2014, pp. 756–57). Levelling down can also occur over a 
longer period of time: for instance, if some policy aiming to 
alleviate inequality slows economic growth sufficiently then 
it can be the case that an alternative arrangement without 
the policy, but with a higher level of economic growth, can 
result in a greater level of well-being for the worst off after a 
given period of time (Heath 2009, p. 57). For levelling down 
to occur it has to be the case that a greater level of equality 
is being achieved by lowering the welfare of the better-off. 
However, many movements towards equality which are not 
necessarily instances of levelling down can nonetheless be 
inconsistent with efficiency in the sense that the policies 
designed to achieve those movements towards equality cre-
ate deadweight losses (see the “Justifying the division of 
moral labour” section). These policies need not level down 
in the short term, as they may be straightforwardly redistrib-
utive: although they may level down in the longer term by 
negatively affecting economic growth that would otherwise 
enrich the worst-off to a greater extent than the redistribu-
tive policies. I will argue later in the sections on political, 
social, and distributive justice failures that there are reasons 
to believe that some of the obligations within JFA would 
create efficiency costs.
How should the existence of justice failures influence 
our conception of business ethics? While we might have 
been willing to accept the division of moral labour between 
the market and the state on the assumption that the state 
would comply with its obligations to secure the egalitar-
ian component of the overall theory of justice, in reality 
the state is failing to discharge its obligations on this front. 
These resultant justice failures raise problems for the justi-
fication of the market, because in the context in which we 
were previously discussing the MFA we were only willing 
to accept that markets could be justified by their efficiency-
promoting effects to the extent that the operation of mar-
ket institutions was compatible with a measure of equality. 
Thus justice failures license an extension of the MFA, so that 
equality-based obligations need no longer be given solely 
to the state. Singer argues that, while the responsibility for 
solving justice failures does not necessarily fall on corpora-
tions (it falls on other actors as well), there are pragmatic 
reasons for attributing duties to solve justice failures to them: 
corporations wield significant “power, influence, and volume 
with regards to…hiring, investment, governmental lobbying, 
and so forth”, and so are best able to address these issues 
(Singer 2018, p. 107).
While Singer does not invoke a specific account of justice 
or equality in his analysis, he does offer general features of 
such an account:
(1) A commitment to individual rights and liberties.
(2) A priority given to these rights, liberties, and opportu-
nities.
(3) The assurance that all citizens have the basic goods 
necessary to use these freedoms (Singer 2018, p. 108).
5 Though it is arguable that “equality failures” would be a more 
appropriate term, as Singer’s terminology separates the value of effi-
ciency from an overall conception of justice.
4 To further boost the plausibility of the empirical link between solv-
ing market failures in reasonably competitive markets and promoting 
efficiency, it is worth pointing out that in cases where the truth of the 
second best theory is felt most sharply the state simply does not allow 
competitive markets to form. For example, in cases where an attempt 
to organise competition would fail due to the effect of economies of 
scale (for instance, the provision of roads, sewers, or power distribu-
tion grids) the state actively maintains monopolies: either by organ-
ising supply directly or by controlling the prices that the sole pri-
vate supplier can charge (Heath 2011, p. 26). Here we have the state 
actively supporting a market failure: maintaining a monopoly. But 
this is obviously a case the second best theory captures really well: 
removing this market imperfection would not lead to an increase in 
efficiency. What is predominantly left over once we take these kinds 
of cases, in which the state actively maintains market failures due to 
empirical quirks of certain sectors of the economy, out of the picture 
are those sectors where reasonably competitive markets can be main-
tained. The managers to whom the MFA obligations are directed are 
those who work in these sectors where the empirical generalisation 
that removing market failures will lead to increased efficiency is the 
most accurate.
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From this rough account of justice, the JFA outlines three 
types of justice failure that managers have ethical obligations 
to tackle:
(1) Political justice failures: the failure to secure a govern-
ment sufficiently democratic or independent of special 
economic and social interests.
(2) Social justice failures: insufficiently equal enforcement 
of rights and opportunities.
(3) Distributive justice failures: failure to secure a decent 
distribution of wealth (Singer 2018, p. 108).
I will discuss these obligations in more detail in the sixth, 
seventh, and eighth sections. For now, it is apparent that the 
JFA gives managers more obligations than the MFA, and 
that many of these obligations are generated on the basis 
of the value of morally desirable forms of equality. These 
are values which are, according to Heath, external to the 
market and, according to Singer, would be external to the 
market if the state were fulfilling its equality-based obli-
gations. However, it is worth emphasising that while these 
egalitarian values may be external to the market in the sense 
described above, they are not, according to either the MFA 
or the JFA, external to the overall institutional complex of 
the market and the state. Thus, the JFA is a form of imma-
nent critique in business ethics like the MFA: the difference 
being that the JFA draws its obligations for businesses from 
the immanent norms of the market-plus-state, whereas the 
MFA is a business ethical theory which only draws on the 
norms immanent to market institutions.
Compliance in the MFA and JFA
The MFA and the JFA both produce obligations that go 
against the self-interest of managers within market institu-
tions. Both theories require managers to not exploit market 
failures, even when doing so would be profitable for the firm 
or would be in the manager’s personal self-interest. In addi-
tion, the JFA requires managers to modulate their behav-
iour in accordance with equality-based obligations: these 
obligations may, one can easily imagine, also proscribe 
certain courses of action that would either be profitable for 
the company or in the narrow self-interest of the managers 
themselves. One could argue that the JFA is less attractive 
than the MFA because it is less likely to be motivationally 
effective as a theory of business ethics for managers: assum-
ing that the more obligations people are given which run 
counter to their self-interest, the less they will comply. This 
concern may seem particularly sharp due to the fact that 
managers will be adults at the point that they are first are 
being asked to comply with these obligations, and so the 
potential for socialisation is more limited than with other 
demanding ethics (such as demanding religious moralities) 
where people’s motivations can be shaped from an earlier 
age.
Singer has addressed this argument with two mutu-
ally supporting points. Firstly, he argues that his goal is to 
“articulate a view of business ethics that is appropriate to the 
institutional setting of the market, not to facilitate its easy 
implementation by dulling its critical bite” (Singer 2019, 
p. 253). It is important to work out what businesses ought 
to be doing, even if it is difficult to secure compliance with 
these obligations. Secondly, Singer points out that we do 
indeed need “a way of moving from the aspirational to the 
practical” (Singer 2019, p. 253) so that the principles of the 
JFA can actually be effective. He suggests that, in current 
business environments, compliance with the JFA’s obliga-
tions will be difficult to secure because if a business tried 
to carry out these obligations unilaterally they would find 
themselves hobbled in competition with their rivals. Indeed, 
this point holds for the obligations from the MFA as well: 
if one company decides to stop exploiting market failures 
while its rivals do not, then that company will be swiftly 
driven out of business (Heath 2018, p. 516). Both Heath and 
Singer agree that the fact that individual companies would 
go out of business if they followed the MFA or JFA’s obliga-
tions in the absence of other firms doing the same is at best 
an excuse for not following those obligations: not a justifi-
cation for why those firms should not have to follow said 
obligations (Heath 2018; Singer 2019, p. 253). Furthermore, 
this excuse is conditional. It is only available to firms on the 
condition that they are engaged in efforts to try to bring other 
firms into compliance: for instance, by supporting govern-
ment regulation aimed at resolving the underlying market 
failure or justice failure (Heath 2018, pp. 527–531; Singer 
2019, pp. 253–254). In my discussion below of the JFA’s 
obligations I will highlight that, in some cases, an argument 
for the MFA’s moral division of labour is that having the 
state enforce certain obligations through regulation is the 
best way to deal with the compliance problems that the JFA 
would otherwise encounter.
Before discussing in more detail the obligations recom-
mended by the JFA, I will first elucidate a distinction that is 
necessary to properly compare the MFA and JFA.
Three Types of Obligations for Managers
When thinking about the set of obligations produced by 
both the MFA and the JFA there is a threefold distinction 
which can help us appreciate the costs and benefits involved 
in choosing one theory or another. Firstly, as I will argue 
below, there are several ethical obligations which can be 
justified on the grounds of either efficiency or equality. I will 
refer to these as obligations with a dual justification. Where 
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proponents of the JFA recommend that these obligations 
be given to managers in order to alleviate justice failures, 
proponents of the MFA can reply that such obligations are 
already given to managers on efficiency grounds. The inde-
pendent attractiveness of ethical obligations for managers 
with a dual justification is therefore not going to be sufficient 
to motivate a shift from the MFA to the JFA, because these 
obligations can be generated within the framework of the 
MFA.
Secondly, there is a distinction that can be drawn from the 
perspective of the MFA when discussing managerial obliga-
tions based on justice: the distinction between market for-
eign obligations and market antithetical obligations. Market 
foreign obligations are those obligations recommended by 
the JFA that, while they are not justified on the basis of effi-
ciency, can nonetheless be carried out by managers without 
reducing efficiency in the market: notably by not hampering 
businesses ability to compete, and thus reducing the ability 
of the market to drive prices towards market-clearing lev-
els. Market antithetical obligations are those justice-based 
obligations which would reduce efficiency in the market if 
they were carried out: normally these would be obligations 
which would require managers to spend resources which 
would otherwise be spent realising efficiency gains through 
competition (by, for example, investing to bring down costs 
or increase quality). As such, market antithetical obligations 
come with a cost attached: if followed, they can be expected 
to reduce the number of Pareto-efficient exchanges that will 
occur in the economy.
In what follows, I will argue that the MFA already 
contains several of the obligations promoted by Singer as 
features of the JFA: these are then obligations with a dual 
justification. I will also argue that there are several market 
foreign obligations in the JFA that can be incorporated by 
the MFA.
As I described in the first section, the MFA does have a 
conception of justice that includes the promotion of morally 
desirable forms of equality as part of its overall normative 
schema. It is simply the case that obligations to promote 
equality are to be predominantly taken care of by the state, 
because giving such obligations to the market, particularly 
obligations of distributive justice, is very likely to represent 
a channelling of resources away from competition, thus dis-
torting the price mechanism and therefore leading to losses 
of efficiency (Heath 2009, pp. 162–163; 2013, p. 167). But, 
for something to be a market-foreign obligation as described 
above, it would be the case that said obligation will not lead 
to efficiency losses: and so the rationale for not asking man-
agers to follow such obligations is not present. If managers 
can fulfil such obligations then it would be better if they 
did, because in so doing they would enhance the egalitarian 
component of justice in their society while not decreasing 
efficiency. In the next three sections, I will briefly describe 
the three kinds of justice-based obligations prescribed by the 
JFA, and in each case see if there are any obligations with a 
dual justification or market foreign obligations that could be 
incorporated into the MFA. Those obligations with a dual 
justification can be argued to be already implicit within the 
original MFA. Meanwhile, the original MFA, plus any mar-
ket foreign obligations that can be identified, I shall call the 
MFA + . Of course, one could also refer to this hybrid theory 
as the JFA-. I leave this matter of preference up to the reader. 
The fundamental point to understand about the MFA + /JFA- 
is that it treats losses of efficiency as a hard constraint on 
the equality-based obligations that can be given to managers 
in market institutions. I will now turn to the three classes 
of obligations for managers promoted by the JFA. In my 
discussion of these obligations I will also point out how the 
effects of the obligations on efficiency bears on the division 
of moral labour that is promoted by the MFA.
Political Justice Failures
The JFA gives managers justice-based obligations to not 
exploit or exacerbate political justice failures. One key obli-
gation is to not attempt to bypass the democratic process 
by funding political campaigns or lobbying governments 
to adopt policies that the corporation would prefer (Singer 
2018, p. 109). It is in the case of political justice failures 
that the MFA has the easiest time incorporating the JFA’s 
obligations. This is because much of the lobbying under-
taken by corporations is rent-seeking: where corporations 
attempt to secure subsidies or other public policies from 
government that benefit them but harm their competitors 
(Mueller 2003, Chap. 15; Marotta 2013). Such rent-seek-
ing does not generate any wealth, it simply redirects it, and 
straightforwardly goes against the MFA’s obligation to “[c]
ompete only through price and quality” (Heath 2014, p. 37). 
In addition, rent-seeking behaviour among firms generates 
large deadweight losses (Brennan 2016, E-3-E-4): as such it 
can easily be condemned on efficiency grounds alone. In the 
case of corporations lobbying politicians in order to secure 
rents, both the MFA and the JFA condemn such behaviour 
and give managers an obligation not to pursue such actions: 
as such, we have a clear case of a dual justification. As such, 
the desirability of such an obligation will not count in favour 
of switching from the MFA to the JFA, as the obligation can 
already be motivated by concerns of efficiency.
Not all instances of lobbying are rent-seeking which 
can be condemned on efficiency grounds: sometimes there 
is the influence of strong political interests in the demo-
cratic process, and such influence seems straightforwardly 
unjust, rather than inefficient (Singer 2018, p. 109). None-
theless, since the prescription is therefore that corporations 
should not engage in such practices, this obligation can be 
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incorporated into the MFA + . Here’s why: asking corpora-
tions to not lobby for political causes will not divert any 
resources away from competition, and therefore will not 
lower their contributions to overall efficiency. In asking 
managers to not partake in such lobbying on the grounds 
that it is unjust, we are giving them a market foreign obliga-
tion consistent with their pursuit of profit as constrained by 
the MFA’s efficiency-based obligations.
However, there is a further case of lobbying which is 
harder to condemn from within the MFA or the MFA + . 
This is the case of a company spending money on political 
lobbying, but where the lobbying is also part of the com-
pany’s branding and thus part of their competitive strategy 
within the marketplace. In such a case, the quality that some 
consumers see in the company’s products would be partly 
constituted by the political lobbying: and so the spending 
would not constitute a channelling of resources away from 
competition, because the spending would itself be a competi-
tive strategy designed to increase sales.6 An obligation to 
ameliorate this type of political justice failure would need 
to be justified from within the JFA.
Social Justice Failures
The key obligation that Singer discusses as following from 
social justice failures is the ethical obligation of businesses 
to engage in affirmative action projects to try to alleviate 
historical injustices against (for example) women and ethnic 
minorities (Singer 2018, pp. 110–112). It seems intuitively 
ethically plausible that we should try to alleviate such ine-
qualities, and affirmative action programmes are an option 
to achieve this. To some extent the MFA is weaker when 
responding to social justice failures than political ones. For 
one thing, sometimes discrimination against certain dis-
advantaged social groups can actually be justified on effi-
ciency grounds; not directly because of factors like race, 
sex, or gender, but rather because discriminated-against 
groups will often be (for instance) poorer, less skilled, or 
less credit-worthy as a result of historical disadvantage (Sun-
stein 1991, pp. 26–30). Having affirmative action in these 
circumstances is likely to reduce efficiency: thus it would 
be a market antithetical obligation. However, there can 
be circumstances in which affirmative action can actually 
promote efficiency, when it allows efficient “use of minor-
ity and female human resources” that has previously been 
prevented by discriminatory attitudes (Holzer 2007, p. 49). 
While the evidence is complex (Holzer and Neumark 2006), 
and it is difficult to measure the effects of affirmative action 
(Joseph and Coleman 1997, pp. 267–268; Durlauf 2008), 
there is some indication that beneficiaries of affirmative 
action programmes do not perform worse in the job market, 
and generate positive externalities for others (Holzer 2007, 
p. 64). In addition, a recent study by Beaurain and Masclet 
(2016) has suggested that having hiring quotas for women 
does not affect firm efficiency: this is positive news for the 
MFA + , as it suggests that in certain cases affirmative action 
will not affect a firm’s ability to compete with other firms, 
and thus to help drive prices towards market-clearing lev-
els. However, it will depend on the evidence whether there 
are negative effects on efficiency for any given affirmative 
action programme (Joseph and Coleman 1997, p. 270). 
Thus, the obligations to carry out certain affirmative action 
programmes may count as obligations with a dual justi-
fication where they also promote efficiency, or as market 
foreign obligations where they have no negative effect on 
efficiency, whereas obligations to carry out other affirmative 
action programmes may be market antithetical obligations 
which conflict with corporations’ contributions to overall 
efficiency.7 The MFA will already contain the first set of 
obligations, while the MFA + should contain the first and 
second category of obligations, but not the third.
The issue of social justice failures raises an interesting 
point about the division of moral labour promoted by the 
MFA. The division of moral labour states that we should 
leave egalitarian obligations to the state, rather than giving 
them to the market: because giving them to the market would 
result in significant efficiency losses. Let’s assume that a 
certain kind of affirmative action program is obligatory from 
the point of view of a morally desirable form of equality, and 
let us also assume (not completely implausibly) that said 
program would lead to unrealised Pareto-efficient exchanges. 
Now return to the division of moral labour: why is it prefer-
able, from the standpoint of efficiency, that this obligation 
be carried out by the state legislating that businesses follow 
the affirmative action program rather than that this obliga-
tion apply directly to businesses? It would seem that the 
effect on efficiency would be the same in either situation. It 
also seems undesirable to claim that the negative efficiency 
effects simply rule out the pursuit of the obligation: after all, 
it was part of the attraction of the MFA that, while market 
actors are only accountable to efficiency, some obligations 
of equality can still be discharged by the state.
The strongest argument for giving the obligation to the 
state in this case would seem to be that doing so is the best 
6 Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for pointing out this kind of 
political justice failure.
7 An interesting question (which I cannot pursue fully here) is who is 
responsible for doing the painstaking empirical work needed to work 
out whether a given affirmative action programme is likely to reduce 
efficiency. If this responsibility goes to businesses, then it will cer-




way to ensure compliance. If the obligation is given to busi-
nesses, and not enforced by the state, then it seems likely 
that there will be widespread non-compliance. If the state 
enforces the obligation on businesses and punishes them for 
deviating, then there is at least a mechanism in place to try to 
ensure compliance. It is interesting that the natural response 
to compliance problems under the JFA in this case would 
seem to be to re-apportion the division of moral labour back 
towards the state.
Distributive Justice Failures
Singer argues that business have obligations to alleviate dis-
tributive justice failures by not dodging taxes, by respecting 
collective bargaining processes with unions, and by taking 
steps to pay more than the market wage in situations where 
the market wage would be intolerable in a just liberal society 
(Singer 2018, pp. 112–113). The second obligation I leave 
for reasons of space and complexity.8 The first obligation, to 
not evade taxation, is one which Heath would likely argue 
in favour of as well. However, the MFA has something of 
a problem here. The MFA generates a powerful argument 
in favour of not evading taxes when (as is often the case) 
those taxes are being raised in order to be used by the state 
to promote efficiency: evading such taxes would run coun-
ter to the value of efficiency (Heath 2014, pp. 200–201). 
However, taxes are also raised for redistributive purposes, 
and it is hard to see how the evasion of these taxes could be 
condemned from within the MFA on efficiency grounds. 
In reality, of course, it is likely not possible to only evade 
those taxes which are going to be used for redistribution: but 
it remains ethically uncomfortable that the MFA would be 
seemingly unable to condemn such targeted evasion were 
it an option.
Regarding the third obligation, to pay more than the mar-
ket wage in situations where the market wage would be intol-
erable in a just liberal society, Singer argues that this would 
be best carried out through a fair or living wage. Singer 
himself is agnostic about the best way to determine wages 
in order to address “the concerns of justice failure without 
sacrificing too much by way of efficiency”, but he consid-
ers that efforts to promote a living or fair wage may help to 
combat this distributive justice failure (Singer 2018, p. 113).
If promoting a living or fair wage is indeed the policy that 
the JFA would recommend, then it seems that this policy 
could be condemned by the MFA as an example of the “just-
price fallacy”: fixing wages in this way will take the price of 
labour away from the market-clearing price, thus distorting 
the signalling function of the price of labour, and reducing 
efficiency (Heath 2009, pp. 150–175, 2013a, p. 168).9 The 
MFA would, instead, recommend redistributing wealth via 
taxes: however, it would largely recommend taxing people 
only to increase efficiency (for instance, to provide a public 
good such as healthcare that is not efficiently provided by 
private businesses due to market failures (Heath 2009, pp. 
81–97), or to discourage an externality, like pollution), and 
then using this money to achieve an egalitarian distribu-
tion, either by straightforwardly redistributing tax money or 
by implementing taxation in a progressive fashion, or both 
(Heath 2009, p. 287). Focussing on these specific kinds of 
taxation is done to mitigate the deadweight losses associ-
ated with taxation. There is an administrative cost involved 
in collecting taxes, and, in addition, taxes raise transaction 
costs so that some transactions that would otherwise occur 
do not (and so we have some deadweight loss). Following 
Heath, we can suppose that it ‘costs’ (through administra-
tive and transaction costs) the state on average 15¢ to collect 
every $1 of tax revenue10 (Heath 2009, p. 284): if the pur-
pose of the tax is to promote efficiency by curbing a market 
failure, then the efficiency gains created by any particular 
tax should ideally be greater than the efficiency loss associ-
ated with the deadweight loss of collecting that tax. So, in 
most cases, the MFA would always recommend fulfilling the 
demands of redistributive justice through such taxes rather 
than through fixing the price of labour. Obligations for man-
agers to set minimum wages would lead to efficiency losses, 
and thus be market antithetical obligations.
However, there is a set of situations in which the MFA 
could endorse the setting of minimum wages. This is the 
situation where a labour market is dominated by a monop-
sony: a company which is the sole buyer of labour (Varian 
2010, pp. 488–491). In such a case, the state should set the 
minimum wage at the rate that it would be in a competitive 
market: this is represented by the notation [Wc]. With the 
price of labour being set at a certain rate, the monopsonist 
9 On the efficiency problems that can result from fixing wages see 
also Brennan (2019, p. 25). Brennan also highlights how fixing wages 
can hurt the workers that such measures are intended to help due to 
capital substitution or job gentrification (23–24).
10 On how this figure is estimated, see Heath (2009, p. 284, Endnote 
8). For brief survey of other estimates of the deadweight loss associ-
ated with taxation see Lindert (2004, p. 232): estimates range from a 
low of 50¢ per dollar of tax raised to a high of $2.49 per dollar of tax 
raised, though Lindert notes that this latter estimate is atypical and, 
indeed, implausible given empirical evidence.
8 There is a debate within economics on whether collective bargain-
ing by unions promotes Pareto efficiency or not. Empirical evidence 
suggests that in some markets negotiations between unions and 
employers results in the exploitation of all potential gains from trade 
between the two parties (the Efficient Bargaining model). However, in 
many other cases this model is not vindicated, and there is a need for 
new models to be proposed (Lawson 2011).
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company will be forced to hire workers until the value of 
the marginal product equals [Wc]. This will “make the firm 
behave as though it faced a competitive market” (Varian 
2010, p. 491). In such a case, an obligation to pay a mini-
mum wage that equals [Wc] could be justified from within 
the MFA on efficiency grounds. Justifying a higher wage 
than this would have to be done from within the JFA, as such 
wages would be likely to create efficiency reducing distor-
tions to the price mechanism (Brennan 2019) and so could 
not be justified from within the MFA + .
As in the previous section, we can ask how the discus-
sion about distributive justice failures bears on the divi-
sion of moral labour. We have seen that fixing the price of 
labour will lead to deadweight losses. However, the state 
fixes the price of labour through minimum wage laws, and 
this state action is justified by distributive justice considera-
tions (Heath 2014, p. 191). So why, in this case, should we 
uphold the division of moral labour and insist upon the state 
carrying out this obligation? The reason, as in the previous 
section, seems to be that having the state enforce the mini-
mum wage is the best way to avoid compliance problems. 
Zooming out from the minimum wage to take account of 
more general distributive justice considerations, it is also the 
case (as mentioned in the “Justifying the division of moral 
labour” section) that the state has many means to secure 
distributive justice at minimal efficiency cost that are sim-
ply unavailable to businesses: and so the division of moral 
labour can be recommended on these grounds also.
Which Theory: MFA, MFA + , or JFA?
I have now sketched the outlines of three closely related 
theories of business ethics. All three theories agree that effi-
ciency and equality are crucial elements of the overall theory 
of justice that we should use to assess the overall system 
of social cooperation. The disagreement that separates the 
MFA and MFA + from the JFA is on how obligations to pro-
mote efficiency and obligations to promote equality should 
be divided between market actors and state actors (Smith 
2019, pp. 134–137): it is a disagreement about the moral 
division of labour.
The MFA holds that market actors should be given obli-
gations justified by the promotion of efficiency, and that the 
state should carry out obligations justified by efficiency and 
obligations promote morally desirable forms of equality. 
Market actors are to be held account only to this weaker 
criterion of social justice, namely Pareto efficiency, on the 
grounds that giving them obligations to promote more robust 
values of fairness and equality is likely to undermine the 
competitive orientation of market interactions, which will 
have the downstream effect of distorting prices and so under-
mining the efficiency gains that justify market institutions 
in the first place (Heath 2013a, pp. 167–169, 2014, Chap. 
7). Equality is to be pursued by the state, through various 
means (“through progressive taxation, cross-subsidization 
within social insurance schemes, provision of means-tested 
benefits, reduced barriers to intergenerational social mobil-
ity, etc.” (Heath 2014, pp. 203–204)), so that we might get 
the benefits of equality while minimally undermining the 
efficiency gains made possible through market institutions. 
However, I have also highlighted that there are several equal-
ity-based market-foreign obligations which can be given to 
market actors without leading to efficiency costs. These are 
the obligations which divide the MFA + from the MFA, and 
they show that the division of moral labour can be broken 
without efficiency costs. There are other instances where 
pursuing an equality-based obligation will seemingly lead 
to equivalent efficiency losses whether it is given to the state 
or to market actors: in these cases, the best argument for the 
division of moral labour is that giving these obligations to 
the state is a better way to secure compliance than giving 
the obligations to market actors. One important conclusion 
of this paper is therefore that the division of moral labour is 
more like a heuristic than a law (and in this respect the JFA 
is vindicated). It is an empirical matter whether giving cer-
tain equality-based obligations to market actors will reduce 
efficiency, and in situations where equality-based obligations 
can be expected to reduce efficiency it is an empirical matter 
whether the state will be able to carry out such obligations 
at a lower efficiency cost than market actors.
The JFA holds that, as far as the division of moral labour 
is concerned, the state is not keeping up its end of the bar-
gain. We are faced with numerous justice failures: and as 
powerful and resourceful actors within our societies, busi-
nesses have a duty to try to resolve these justice failures. In 
my discussion of the MFA + I have tried to bring out the 
most likely efficiency costs of giving these equality-based 
obligations to market actors. However, clearly the mere pros-
pect of these costs (even if I am correct in thinking that they 
would be likely to occur) is not enough to settle the issue of 
which theory of business ethics we should prefer: below, I 
will attempt to sketch the considerations that might be rel-
evant to resolving the trade-offs between equality and effi-
ciency that we face. I have also argued, as mentioned above, 
that many of the compliance problems that the JFA would 
likely encounter would be most plausibly ameliorated by 
trying to get the state to enforce equality-based obligations 
on businesses: thus restoring the division of moral labour 
that the MFA promotes.
One issue at stake at stake in deciding between the 
MFA and the JFA is how much efficiency we are willing to 
give up for how much (and what kinds) of equality. This is 
a normative issue, but it is deeply bound up with practical 
issues of the feasibility of different kinds of institutional 
arrangement. Heath has argued that in the non-ideal world 
 C. Blunden 
1 3
in which we find ourselves we should accept a compromise 
in which we use competitive markets to generate prices 
(with their associated efficiency-promoting effects), even 
though using this form of large-scale, anonymous, and 
decentralised form of cooperation means that we largely 
lose “direct control over the system of allocation, and so 
are unable to ensure that it satisfies the norm of equality” 
(Heath 2014, p. 191). Singer also shares a concern with 
balancing efficiency and equality as normative principles, 
as we saw in the third section. While I have not suggested 
that tasking market actors with obligations to combat jus-
tice failures will lead to levelling down, it is likely to be 
the case that giving them such obligations will lead to 
reductions in efficiency. However, maybe this sacrifice of 
efficiency is acceptable in exchange for egalitarian gains? 
I will discuss further below how we might go about resolv-
ing this question.
A second, and related, issue at stake is whether it is 
feasible that the MFA’s proposed division of labour in 
which the state takes care of egalitarian concerns is likely 
to be successful. Put bluntly, if we think it’s possible to 
get a large amount of the egalitarian benefits that the 
JFA argues businesses should try to secure through state 
action instead, and if we think that having these obliga-
tions discharged by the state will be more efficient than 
if they were discharged by businesses in a competitive 
market, then the choice facing us doesn’t seem particu-
larly stark. Should we prefer situation A, with levels of 
social, political, and distributional equality x and with a 
greater number of Pareto-efficient exchanges, or situation 
B, with levels of social, political, and distributional equal-
ity x and with fewer Pareto-efficient exchanges? It is of 
course unlikely that the two options would be identical 
with regard to the kinds of equality that could be secured: 
however, as our estimation of the egalitarian gains that the 
state could secure grows closer to the egalitarian gains that 
we believe could be secured by the state and market actors 
then the corresponding efficiency cost of having market 
actors secure those gains would be increasingly meaning-
ful when considering the trade-off between efficiency and 
equality that we face with some of the JFA’s obligations 
for managers. The relative efficiency costs of having the 
state pursue an equality-based obligation vs. having mar-
ket actors do so is an empirical question, which must be 
assessed in each individual case using empirical evidence.
How might we decide what level of efficiency costs we 
are willing to bear for a certain level of equality? It does not 
seem possible to decide this question at a theoretical level: 
instead I am inclined to agree with Singer and Amit Ron that 
this is the kind of question that must be resolved politically 
through democratic means (Singer and Ron 2020), as it is 
a matter of political opinion how much one values equality 
relative to efficiency.11 However, if such a decision is to have 
implications for which obligations go to market actors and 
which to the state, then it will also need to take into account 
a great deal of complex empirical information about the rela-
tive efficiency costs of different ways of securing egalitarian 
gains. For example, Jeffrey Smith and Singer & Ron argue 
that corporations cannot merely be seen to be governed by 
norms of efficiency, because they are also beholden to “a 
host of other social values we seek to pursue through the 
construction, regulation, and legal implementation of com-
merce” (Singer and Ron 2020, p. 143; Smith 2019). How-
ever, how effective the market is at promoting efficiency, 
how effective it is at promoting various other values, and 
how effective other institutional arrangements are at promot-
ing efficiency and other values are all empirical questions 
that have a great deal of bearing on how we should divide 
moral labour among institutions. One of Heath’s central 
points is that markets are unique in the kinds of efficiency 
gains they can secure through the price mechanism: and that 
it is primarily their effectiveness in this regard which justi-
fies them. While it is a normative question of how desirable 
this efficiency is, how effective markets are are at promot-
ing efficiency when compared to other institutional arrange-
ments is an empirical question.
Trying to resolve the issue of an acceptable efficiency-
equality trade-off through democratic decision-making is, 
I believe, the most defensible path of action available, as 
I do not see how this issue can be decided a priori through 
normative theory. However, because the issue is both empiri-
cally and normatively complex we should be concerned that 
issues of political ignorance and irrationality (Achen and 
Bartels 2016; Brennan 2020) could severely hamper the 
prospects of a democratic resolution to this problem. Tak-
ing such problems seriously would be an important part 
of thinking about how issues of business ethics could be 
addressed democratically.
Conclusion
We now have three business ethics theories to choose from: 
the MFA, the MFA + (the MFA plus all the market foreign 
obligations outlined above, and any others which can be 
11 As Singer and Ron point out, a commitment to using democratic 
means to resolve such value questions may also be a source of obli-
gations for market actors: market actors would then have an obliga-
tion to “have an understanding of, and ethical disposition toward 
moderating, their effects on democracy” (Singer and Ron 2020, p. 
151). Because such norms would be immanent in the process that is 
used to resolve questions of efficiency-equality trade-offs, it does not 
seem plausible that efficiency consequences could be used to object 
to these obligations.
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discovered), and the JFA. Which should we prefer? The 
MFA + is arguably more ethically attractive than the MFA, 
as it includes several justice-based obligations which, by 
definition, do not come with the cost of reducing the effi-
ciency of the economy. Our choice of business ethical theory 
may also be influenced by the motivational point raised in 
the fourth section: the more ethical obligations one puts into 
a theory, the more one should worry about compliance prob-
lems. However, it is an open question the extent to which 
compliance problems should affect our choice of normative 
theories. If compliance problems are a concern, then the 
MFA may appear more attractive than the MFA + : how-
ever, this is more of an intramural dispute than the choice 
between market failures approaches and the JFA. The JFA 
no doubt promotes equality, but, as we have seen, it gener-
ates several obligations which will reduce efficiency. The 
market antithetical obligations which are unique to the JFA 
all come with a cost in efficiency: in each case this should 
make us seriously consider whether there are other ways 
to achieve the same desirable kinds of equality without the 
efficiency costs.
Ultimately, the key decision between the MFA/
MFA + and the JFA has to rest on how much efficiency one 
is willing to sacrifice a certain level of equality. I have not 
tried to resolve this question in this paper: in large part this 
is because I am not sure about what the answer should be, 
and I am inclined to think that it is the kind of question that 
must be resolved politically, and with attention to the prob-
lems with democracy which make it difficult to politically 
resolve such empirically and normatively complex questions. 
However, I am sure that such a discussion must require a 
clear and perspicuous counting of the costs and benefits of 
each theory.
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